Computational Irreducibility and Computational Analogy by Zwirn, Herve
1 
 
Computational Irreducibility and Computational Analogy 
 
HERVE ZWIRN   
 
UFR de Physique (LIED, Université Paris 7), CMLA (ENS Cachan, France) & IHPST(CNRS, France)   
herve.zwirn@gmail.com 
October 2013 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In a previous paper [21], we provided a formal definition for the concept of computational irreducibility (CIR), 
i.e. the fact for a function f from N to N  that it is impossible to compute f(n) without following approximately 
the same path than computing successively all the values f(i) from i=1 to n. Our definition is based on the 
concept of E-Turing machines (for Enumerating Turing Machines) and on the concept of approximation of 
E-Turing machines for which we also gave a formal definition. We precise here these definitions through some 
modifications intended to improve the robustness of the concept. We introduce then a new concept: the 
Computational Analogy and prove some properties of computationally analog functions. Computational Analogy 
is an equivalence relation which allows partitioning the set of computable functions in classes whose members 
have the same properties regarding to their computational irreducibility and their computational complexity. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion of Computational Irreducibility (CIR) seems to 
have been first put forward by Wolfram. Given a physical 
system whose behavior can be calculated by simulating 
explicitly each step of its evolution, is it always possible to 
predict the outcome without tracing each step? Is there 
always a shortcut to go directly to the n
th
 step? Wolfram 
conjectured
 
[16, 17, 18] that in most cases the answer is 
no. While many computations admit shortcuts that allow 
them to be performed more rapidly, others cannot be sped 
up. Computations that cannot be sped up by means of any 
shortcut are called computationally irreducible. 
This question has been widely analyzed in the context of 
cellular automata by Wolfram [15, 17]. A cellular 
automaton is computationally irreducible if in order to 
know the state of the system after n steps there is no other 
way than to evolve the system n times according to the 
equations of motion. The intuition behind this definition is 
that there is no other way to reach the n
th
 state than to go 
through the (n-1) previous ones.  
In this context, Israeli and Goldenfeld in [9] have shown 
that some automata that are apparently computationally 
irreducible have nevertheless properties that are 
predictable. But these properties are obtained by coarse 
graining and don’t account for small scales details. 
Moreover some automata (rule 30 for example) seem to be 
impossible to coarse grain.   
Reisinger et al. in [14] show that computational 
irreducibility seems to be contingent upon the 
representation of a given problem. To do so, they consider 
a game for which the initial rules are computationally 
reducible and they build an isomorphic representation 
leading to a process that appears to be computationally 
irreducible. As they notice, a more definitive claim would 
be to take one of Wolfram's computationally irreducible 
cellular automata, formulate an isomorphic representation 
of it, and then determine whether transition rules of the 
equivalent system are computationally reducible. 
Whatever the answers to the questions raised by Israeli and 
Goldenfeld or by Reisinger et al. are, what is of interest for 
us in this paper is to provide a robust formal definition of 
the very concept of computational irreducibility which is 
lacking. Indeed, as we explained in [21], Wolfram’s 
intuition needs to be rigorously formalized since stated as 
above, it is not robust. There are two underlying intuitions 
that seem to be equally important in the concept of CIR. 
The first one is the question of the speed of computation. If 
a process is CIR then it should not be possible to compute 
its n
th
 state in a time shorter than the time needed to 
compute successively the (n-1) previous states before 
computing the n
th
. The second one, is even more 
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demanding. After all, it could well be possible that the 
time to compute the n
th
 state be not shorter than the sum of 
the times needed to compute successively all the previous 
states but that the computation of the n
th
 state doesn’t need 
to really go through the computation of theses states. But 
for a process to be CIR, the necessity to actually compute 
these previous states is required. Of course, the second 
condition implies the first one. In the following, we will 
address both conditions. 
In [21], we provided a first formal definition for the 
concept of computational irreducibility which we 
re-expressed in the more general framework of functions f 
from N to N as the fact that it is impossible to compute f(n) 
without following approximately the same path than 
computing successively all the values f(i) from i=1 to n. 
Our definition is based on the concept of E-Turing 
machines (for Enumerating Turing Machines) and on the 
concept of approximation of E-Turing machines for which 
we also gave a formal definition.  
In the present paper, we precise these definitions and bring 
some modifications intended to improve the robustness of 
the concept.  We refer the reader to the original paper for 
the motivations of the initial definitions. Here, we also 
introduce a new concept: the Computational Analogy.  
In the part 1, we justify the computation model we use 
throughout this paper. In the part 2, we precise the 
definition of the E-Turing machines and their 
approximations and we give more details on the definition 
of the concept of Computational Irreducibility. In the part 
3, we introduce Computational Analogy, discuss its 
meaning and prove some theorems for functions that are 
computationally analog, relatively to their computational 
irreducibility and their computational complexity. 
2. Part 1 : The computational model 
In this paper, we adopt the computational model of Turing 
machines [6, 7, 8, 13] with k ≥ 2 tapes. So, let’s begin by 
justifying our choice to use the k-tape Turing machines as 
a good computational model. We are looking for a general 
model of computation allowing to deal with the questions 
of efficiency and of speed of computation in a robust way. 
It is well known that the model of Turing machines is a 
powerful though very fundamental model of computation. 
The main point with the Turing machines model is that it 
is very simple and that through the Church-Turing thesis, it 
allows the computation of any computable function. 
Several kinds of Turing machines exist depending on the 
number of tapes they have. While they are all equivalent 
regarding the functions they allow to compute, they are not 
equivalent regarding the speed of computation. For 
example, the problem of deciding if a string is a 
palindrome is O(n
2
)
1
 in the 1-tape Turing machines model 
and O(n) in the 2-tape Turing machines model [7, 13]. Is 
increasing the number of tapes allowing to improve 
without limit the speed of the computation of a given 
problem? This answer is no. A first result
 
[13] says that we 
can't expect more than a quadratic saving through allowing 
an arbitrary number of tapes.  
Theorem 2.1. Given any k-tape Turing machine M 
operating within time T(n), it is possible to construct a 
1-tape Turing machine M' operating within time O(T(n)
2
) 
and such that for any input x, M(x)=M'(x). 
The meaning of this result is that the best k-tape machine 
that can be designed for doing a computation will never 
operate in less that       if the best 1-tape Turing 
machine doing the same computation operates in a time 
T(n).  
A second result [13] is known as linear speed-up: 
Theorem 2.2. For any k-tape Turing machine M operating 
in time T(n) there exists a k'-tape Turing machine M' 
operating in time f'(n)=T(n)+n (where  is an arbitrary 
small positive constant) which simulates M.  
This linear speed-up means that the main aspect of 
complexity is captured through the function T(n) 
irrespectively of any multiplicative constant. 
DTIME(T(n)) is the class of functions
2
 computable by a 
k-tape Turing machine in T(n) steps. This result means that 
DTIME(T(n)) = DTIME(T(n)) and so it's legitimate to 
define DTIME(T(n)) as the class of functions computable 
by a Turing machine in O(T(n)) steps. If a function f is 
computable in time T(n) and log(f(n)) (hence the length of 
its binary representation) is o(T(n)) then f is also 
computable in time T(n) for every  > 0. 
Hence, in the k-tape Turing machines model, the speed of 
computation can be expressed through the O(T(n)) 
notation which is justified. That is what we will do all over 
the paper as is usual in the field of computational 
complexity. 
More results about the so called “speed-up theorems” are 
given in our previous paper [21].  
Usually, in the theory of computation, one is only 
interested in knowing if a function is computable and if so, 
in knowing the computational complexity of getting the 
output from the input. What is done during the 
computation is rarely considered and, except for the person 
writing the program itself, the Turing machine is a kind of 
                                                          
1
 We refer the reader to the appendix A at the end of the paper for the 
definition of the standard asymptotic notations. 
2 More precisely the class of decision problems. 
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black box furnishing an output from an input.  But in this 
paper, we are interested in a particular aspect of 
computation that is not often addressed: the intermediate 
results. As we stated in the introduction, a cellular 
automaton is computationally irreducible if in order to 
know the state of the system after n steps there is no other 
way than to evolve the system n times according to the 
equations of motion. Similarly for a function, to be CIR 
means that the computation of f(n) requires the previous 
computation of all the f(i) for i < n.  CIR functions are 
defined not by an explicit formula giving directly the value 
of f(n) from the value of n but by recursive rules giving the 
way to go from f(i) to f(i+1)
3
. So, following these rules, the 
computation of f(n) starts by the computation of f(1) 
followed by the computation of f(2) from f(1) then of f(3) 
from f(2) and so on, till the computation of f(n) from 
f(n-1). So, in order to be able to characterize that sort of 
computation, our computational model should allow 
identifying the intermediate computation steps. For that, 
we will consider special 3-symbols (0, 1, #) Turing 
machines such that each of these intermediate results will 
be successively written on the output tape with the symbol 
“#” written at its left. More precisely, a program that 
follows a recursive rule for computing step by step through 
the iteration of the same rule “knows” when it switches to 
the next iteration. What we demand in our specific model 
of computation is that the intermediate result which is the 
input of the next iteration be written on the output tape at 
the right of the symbol “#”.  The final result will appear on 
the output tape at the right of the last symbol “#”.  The 
output tape will be a one way tape (i.e. the head will be 
allowed to go only in the right direction). We’ll see 
throughout the paper why this kind of special Turing 
machines is useful for our purpose
4
. 
In the following f, g, h, F, G, H will always be functions 
from N to N and M, P, Q will always be Turing machines 
as described above. 
3. Part 2 : The Computational  Irreducibility 
Given a Turing machine M computing f(n) in time 
T(M(n)),
 
let's denote by Rn,1, …, Rn,i, …, Rn,T(M(n)) the 
content of the output tape of M during the computation of 
f(n) after 1 step of computation, …, i steps of computation 
and T(M(n)) steps of computation. So (Rn,1, …, Rn,i, …, 
Rn,T(M(n))) is the sequence of the configurations of the 
output tape during the computation of f(n). 
                                                          
3 Of course, that doesn’t mean that each function defined like that is CIR. 
4 The goal is to be able to distinguish the different results when reading 
the output tape. Instead of using a special symbol to separate the results, 
an equivalent method would be to use a self delimiting way to write them. 
Definition 3.1 (E-Turing machine): A Turing machine Mf 
will be called a E-Turing machine for f if:   
(i) Mf computes f (i.e. for every input n, Mf computes f(n) 
and  halts). It's important to notice that it is the same 
Turing machine which on input n computes f(n): f is 
uniformly computed by Mf . 
(ii) during the computation of f(n), there exist increasing 
kn(i) for i=1 to n-1, such that f(i) is written on the output 
tape          at the right of the last symbol “#”.  
A E-Turing machine for a function f (in the following we 
will always denote Mf such a Turing machine) is a 
program which, in a certain sense, enumerates the 
successive values f(i) for i  n. So, during the computation 
of f(n), f(1) then f(2) and so on until f(n) successively 
appear on the output tape of Mf. It is of course possible to 
build E-Turing machines for any computable function. 
Let f be a computable function. Here are two examples of a 
E-Turing machine for f.  
a) Assume first that M is a Turing machine which on every 
input n computes f(n). Let's now consider the Turing 
machine Mf  which on every input n, calls M with input 1 
then, when M has computed f(1), write “#” and f(1) on the 
output tape, calls again M with input 2 and so on until the 
last call to M with input n and which halts when M has 
computed f(n) after having written “#” and f(n) on the 
output tape. Mf  is clearly a E-Turing machine for f. When 
computing f(n), Mf will follow exactly the same initial 
segments than the initial segments followed for all k < n 
when computing f(k). The computation of f(n) is the 
continuation of the computation of f(k) for k < n.  One can 
also notice that the computation of f for each value n starts 
from scratch (i.e. the values of f(k) for k < n are not used 
for computing f(n)). This way to build a E-Turing machine 
is possible for any computable function. 
b) Assume now that f is such that it is possible to compute 
f(n) from f(n-1). Let M' be a Turing machine which on 
input f(n-1) computes f(n). Let's now consider the Turing 
machine M'f  which on every input n, starts by computing 
f(1), write “#” and f(1) on the output tape, then calls M’ to 
compute f(2) from the input f(1)), write “#” and f(2) on the 
output tape and so on till f(n). M'f  is a E-Turing machine 
for f. The computation of f(n) by Mf can be seen as the 
successive computations of f(i) from f(i-1) till reaching 
f(n). As in the first example, when computing f(n), M’f 
follows exactly the same initial segments than the initial 
segments followed for all k < n when computing f(k). Here 
again, the computation of f(n) is the continuation of the 
computation of f(k) for k < n. 
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Because the initial path is the same when computing f(n) 
and f(m) for n>m, these two examples of E-Turing 
machines can be thought as doing a computation such that 
on any input n, they halt after having run through an initial 
segment of length T(Mf(n)) of one unique infinite virtual 
computation of f(i) for i = 1 to ∞. That means also that the 
kn(i) are independent of n. But this is not necessarily the 
case for all E-Turing machines. 
The computation of f(n) from f(n-1) can be faster than the 
computation of f(n) from n. In this case, M'f will be much 
faster than Mf. We'll see that this is the case if f is CIR 
because a Turing machine computing a CIR function f 
does need to know f(n-1) (or a value that is near in a sense 
that we will precise) to compute f(n). We give here, some 
examples of functions more and more "difficult":  
- For computing f(n) = 3
n
 from the input n, a Turing 
machine will go through some of the intermediate values 
f(i) for i < n but not necessarily all. For instance, 3
2n
  can 
be computed as 3
n
 x
 
3
n
 and 3
2n+3
 will need the computation 
of 3
n+1
  or the computation of  3
n 
 and 3
3
. But if f(n-1) is 
given as input, the computation of f(n) is immediate and 
fast. 
- For computing f(n) = n!, a Turing machine will go 
through n intermediate values if its starts either with n or 
with (n-1)! as input. Indeed even from (n-1)! it is needed to 
know n for computing n! and a natural way (but not the 
only one) to "extract" the value n from (n-1)! is to compute 
all the increasing values of the factorial function and to 
count how many have been computed till reaching (n-1)!. 
The computation from n can be done in any possible order 
since the multiplication of the n first natural numbers can 
be done from any combination of these numbers. That 
means that even if a Turing machine computing n! from n 
will have to perform n operations, it will not necessarily 
computes all the k! for k<n before. So, it seems that every 
natural Turing machine computing n! with either n or 
(n-1)! alone as input will have to perform n operations 
without having to be necessarily a E-Turing machine. But 
that will not be the case with the input (n, (n-1)!) from 
which the computation will be very fast. 
-  For computing f(n) defined by: "the first bit of the sum 
of the k
th 
bit of 3
k
 for all k  n", from the input n, a Turing 
machine will go through all the intermediate values f(i) for 
i < n but will be simply unable to compute f(n) from f(n-1) 
alone because there is no way to extract the value of n 
from f(n-1) and this value is needed to compute f(n). So, it 
seems that every Turing machine computing f(n) with n as 
input will be a E-Turing machine and f(n) could well be 
CIR. From the input (n, f(n-1)) the computation will be 
fast. 
The time T(Mf(n)) to compute f(n) with a E-Turing 
machine Mf is the sum of the times between the apparition 
on the output tape of f(i) and f(i+1)  (from i=1 to n-1) plus 
the initial time to get f(1) appearing.   
Let's denote             
  
        the time between 
the apparition of f(i-1) and the apparition of f(i) during the 
computation of f(n) for any n>i.  
We have              
 
    (we suppose by convention 
that    is the time for f(1) to appear on the output tape). 
Since Mf is a Turing machine,    is the number of steps 
done by the machine and so is a strictly positive integer. 
So T(Mf(n)) ≥ n. But in the following we will be interested 
only in functions f such that T(Mf(n)) = Ω(nlogn). 
This seems a reasonable assumption and it’s obviously true 
of any function f such that f(n) ≥ n since writing an output 
n in binary or in any other basis ≥ 2, needs at least a time 
logn and a E-Turing machine performs n such operations 
before halting. So the time for a E-Turing machine 
computing such a function is necessarily greater than 
i=1 to n logi = log(n!) = (nlogn). So T(Mf(n)) = Ω(nlogn). 
This is true in particular (see below), for the simulation of 
a large number of non trivial one dimensional elementary 
cellular automata with nearest neighbors (which are Ω(n2)) 
and in the majority of the simulations of more complex 
cellular automata (for example Conway’s game of life is 
Ω(n3)). Of course, we’ll consider as well CIR functions for 
which f(n) < n. This is the case of the two candidates given 
below, at the end of part 2, but it is highly probable that 
they satisfy nonetheless T(Mf(n)) = Ω(nlogn). 
The question of knowing whether there is an 
asymptotically optimal program for doing a given 
computation is a difficult and open question in general. We 
mean by asymptotically optimal program, a program p 
such that for any other program p’ doing the same 
computation T(p(n))=O(T(p’(n))).  On the one hand, it is 
well known that the so called Blum’s speedup theorem [1] 
shows that for some decision problems, any program that 
solves the problem will be much slower than some other 
program solving the same problem. In these cases, there 
exists an infinite sequence of programs solving the 
problem such that each program in the sequence is much 
faster than the program it follows and (up to a 
multiplicative constant) there is no asymptotically optimal 
program. But these problems are artificially constructed to 
prove the theorem. On the other hand, Levin’s Optimal 
Search Theorem [11] proves that for a wide class of 
problems there is an asymptotically optimal program. 
These are problems for which verifying a solution is easy 
while producing a solution might be difficult. More 
precisely, these are problems for which the time 
complexity of checking a solution is asymptotically faster 
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than the time complexity of producing a solution. Now, it 
is widely thought that no “natural problem” is subject to 
Blum speedup and that, in general, asymptotically optimal 
algorithms exist for them. In particular, this is the case for 
the cellular automata that are the initial source of 
inspiration for the subject of this paper. Indeed, to show 
that a program P is asymptotically optimal, it is enough to 
show that there is a lower bound, say h(n), on the time 
complexity of any program Q for this problem, 
T(Q(n))=(h(n)), and to prove that T(P(n))=O(h(n)). In 
this case, P is an asymptotically optimal program. For 
example, in the case of the simulation of non trivial one 
dimensional elementary cellular automata with nearest 
neighbors, it is clear that any algorithm computing the n 
initial configurations will have in the worst case to perform 
in (n2) and that there are algorithms performing in O(n2) 
(see [21] for details on this point). So, these algorithms 
will be asymptotically optimal. Hence, any Turing 
machine representing these algorithms will be an 
asymptotically optimal program for the given cellular 
automaton. This is what we call in the following of this 
paper an Efficient E-Turing machine. In the following, 
we’ll make the assumption that there always exist an 
asymptotically optimal Turing machine that we will note 
M*f and an Efficient E-Turing machine that we will note 
Mf
eff
 for any function f we consider. Put differently, let’s 
say that we restrict our scope to the subset of the 
computable functions set made of functions that satisfy 
this requirement (which is hopefully a very large subset). 
We give now the formal definition of an Efficient 
E-Turing machine for a function, which will be a 
fundamental building block for what follows.  
Definition 3.2 (Efficient E-Turing machine):  We will say 
that a E-Turing machine Mf
eff
 for f is an efficient E-Turing 
machine for f if for any other E-Turing machine Mf for f: 
T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(Mf(n))) i.e. there are constants c > 0, 
n0 > 0 such that n > n0, T(Mf
eff
 (n))  cT(Mf(n)). 
As explained above, the intuition is that asymptotically it 
is not possible for a E-Turing machine to compute faster 
than an efficient E-Turing machine.  
It’s clear from the definition that for any two efficient 
E-Turing machines Mf
eff
, M’f
eff
, and for any two 
asymptotically optimal Turing machine M*f, M’*f, we 
have: T(Mf
eff
 (n))=(T(M’f
eff
 (n))) and 
T(M*f (n))=(T(M’*f (n))). So for any function H, 
H(n)=O(T(Mf
eff
 (n))) is equivalent to H(n)=O(T(M’f
eff
 (n))) 
and H(n)=O(T(M*f (n))) is equivalent to 
H(n) = O(T(M’*f  (n))). In the following, Mf
eff
 will always 
denote an efficient E-Turing machine for f and 
T(Mf
eff
(n)) will denote the time for an efficient E-Turing 
machine to compute f(n). M*f will always denote an 
asymptotically optimal Turing machine computing f and 
T(M*f(n)) will denote the time for an asymptotically 
optimal Turing machine to compute f(n). According to 
what is said above, there will be no need to precise which 
particular efficient E-Turing machine or which 
asymptotically optimal Turing machine is considered.    
We recall that in the following we always suppose that 
there exist an asymptotically optimal Turing machine M*f 
and an efficient E-Turing machine Mf
eff
 for f. 
Definition 3.3 (approximation of a E-Turing machine): A 
Turing Machine M will be said to be a P-approximation
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of a E-Turing machine for f if and only if there are a 
function F such that F(n)=O(T(M*f(n))/n) and a Turing 
machine P such that for every n:  
(i) on input n, M computes a result rn such that P computes 
f(n) from n and rn in a number of steps F(n) and halts.  
(ii) during the computation, there exist non decreasing 
kn(i) for i=1 to n-1, such that a result r’n,i is written on the 
output tape          at the right of the last symbol “#”and 
that P computes f(i) from n, i and r’n,i in a number of 
steps F(i) and halts
6
.  
Actually, if we note rn = r’n,n, P computes always from the 
triplet (n, i, r’n,i) here abbreviated en n, rn when i=n.  
Intuitively, an approximation of a E-Turing machine for f 
is a Turing machine doing a computation that is near the 
computation made by a E-Turing machine for f.  
Let's notice that each E-Turing machine for f is of course 
an approximation of a E-Turing machine for f. The 
associated Turing machine P is simply the identity (a 
Turing machine which computes n from the input n)
 7
. 
An approximation P of a E-Turing machine for f can be a 
E-Turing machine for r if the r’n,i don’t depend on n and if 
r’i = ri for all i (that means that the intermediate results are 
the values actually computed by P). But it is not 
necessarily always the case. In particular, it can happens 
that the intermediate results r’n,i from which P computes 
f(i) are different for different values of n. In this case, the 
path that M follows for computing rn is different for 
different values of n and the ri for i<n are not necessarily 
computed. 
The concept of approximation of a E-Turing machine for f 
is actually a concept obtained from the concept of 
                                                          
5
 In the following, we will often say simply “approximation” for 
“P-approximation”. 
6
 In the following, we will often omit to mention again the inputs n, i 
which will be implied. 
7
 Under the condition that F(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n)  =  (l(f(n)). 
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E-Turing machine by relaxing the constraints of the 
definition along three dimensions. The first one is the fact 
that on input n an approximation doesn’t compute exactly 
f(n) but a value r(n) such that it is possible to go from r(n) 
to f(n) through a very short computation. The second one is 
that the intermediate results don’t need to be all the f(i) for 
i<n but values rn,i from which it is possible to compute f(i) 
through a very short computation and the third one is that 
it is even not necessary that the intermediate values be the 
same on every computation for different n.  
Another point to notice is that we don't claim that it is 
necessary to be able to build the Turing machine P which 
is associated to an approximation through an effective 
mean.  We only ask that such a machine exists.   
We can intuitively justify the value chosen for F(n). F(n) is 
the time that the computation of f(n) takes from the value 
rn  that is computed by the approximation. We have in 
mind the case of CIR functions for which computing f(n) 
demands to compute all the previous values. For these 
functions, since we want rn to be “near” in a certain sense 
of f(n), the time to go from rn to f(n) must be very short 
compared to the time to compute f(n) from n and at most 
comparable to the time to compute f(n) from f(n-1). That’s 
the reason why F(n)= O(T(M*f(n))/n). Indeed, if f is CIR, 
we’ll see that this is the average time to compute f(n) from 
f(n-1).  The factor 1/n in T(M*f(n))/n takes into account the 
fact that there are n necessary phases to compute f(n) with 
a E-Turing machine for f and that we want P to compute in 
a time shorter or equal to each one of these phases.    
Another way to understand the value of F(n), coming from 
the picture of cellular automata,  is to think that rn is “near” 
f(n) (and then the computation of f(n) from rn is fast) if 
there are only a bounded number of operations to perform 
on some bits of rn to go from rn to f(n). Indeed, in this 
framework, a bit of f(n) or of  rn is a cell of the cellular 
automaton. That means that F(n) is O(l(rn)) where l(rn) is 
the length of rn. A reasonable assumption is that the length 
of rn should not exceed much the length of f(n) so 
l(rn) = O(logf(n)). That means that F(n) is O(logf(n)).  Now 
as we saw before T(Mf
eff
(n)) = Ω(n logf(n)) so 
logf(n) = O(T(Mf
eff
 (n))/n) then F(n) must be 
O(T(Mf
eff
 (n))/n). Now for CIR functions, we anticipate 
that T(Mf
eff
 (n)) = (T(M*f(n))) so F(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n) 
is equivalent to F(n) = O(T(Mf
eff
 (n))/n). For functions that 
are not CIR and, on the opposite, satisfy 
T(M*f(n)) = o(T(Mf
eff
 (n))), the value 
F(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n)  is the smaller of the two. 
Is it possible to be more demanding and to ask that F(n) be 
smaller than that ? The answer is “no” as it is easy to see 
on the example of one dimension cellular automata. F(n) is 
the time for P to compute f(n) from rn so, in order for P to 
read rn and to write f(n), F(n) must be at least equal to 
l(f(n)). For non trivial automata, l(f(n)) = O(n). If these 
automata are CIR, then T(Mf
eff
 (n)) = (T(M*f(n))) = 
O(n
2
) and so F(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n) = O(n). One can see 
that demanding a smaller value for F(n) would result in the 
fact that no machine P can exist since the time to write f(n) 
is (n).  By the way, one can notice that for these 
automata that are not CIR and for which T(M*f(n)) = o(n
2
), 
there will be no machine P and hence no approximation of 
E-Turing machine for these automata. Indeed, in this case 
F(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n) = o(n) which is too small a value 
for any P to write f(n). Of course, this is true only for 
functions such that l(f(n)) > n which is not mandatory. In 
particular, this is false for trivial automata whose 
configurations vanish after some iterations or for which the 
successive configurations are restricted to one cell. So, the 
above reasoning is not a proof but only an intuitive 
justification of the value of F(n). 
Definition 3.4 (Computation of f(n) based on an 
approximation): Let M be a P-approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for f. Let's consider the computation of  
f(n) done initially through M with input n and continued 
when M has computed rn by P which computes f(n) from n 
and rn in a time F(n) and halts. This computation will be 
said to be a computation of f(n) based on the 
P-approximation M. 
Definition 3.5 (Turing machine computing f based on an 
approximation): Let M be a P-approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for f and let’s consider the Turing 
machine M' which, for every n, computes f(n) through a 
computation based on the P-approximation M. M’ will be 
said to be a Turing machine computing f based on the 
approximation M.  
If M is a E-Turing machine for f, M and M’ are identical 
and M’ is of course a E-Turing machine for f. Otherwise,  
M’ is also an approximation of a E-Turing machine for f. 
The Turing machine P’ associated to M’ is the same than 
P, i.e. P’ computes f(i) from n, i and r’n,i in a number of 
steps F(i), except that for the computation on input n, n 
and r’n,n, P’ is the identity while P computes f(n). 
As shown in theorem 3.1, the important point is that it is 
possible to build a E-Turing machine for f from any 
approximation of a E-Turing machine for f.  
Theorem 3.1:  From any M approximation of a E-Turing 
machine for f it is possible to build a E-Turing machine M' 
for f (we'll call it the daughter of M) computing in a time 
T(M'(n)) = (T(M(n))). 
Proof: Since M is an approximation of a E-Turing 
machine for f, there are a Turing machine P and a function 
F associated as mentioned in the definition 3.3. Let's 
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consider the Turing machine built according the following 
way: on input n, M' does exactly the same computation 
than M but for each i<n, after having computed rn,i  which 
computes f(i) through P with input n, i, rn,i  in a time  F(i), 
writes “#” and f(i) on its output tape and resumes the 
computation and, at last, computes f(n) from n and rn. It's 
clear that M' is a E-Turing machine for f. M' computes in a 
time: T(M'(n)) = T(M(n)) +           + O(1) 
= T(M(n)) +        
             + O(1) 
Now it is possible to compute f(n) by M followed by P 
(that is a computation of f based on the approximation M) 
so T(M*f(n)) = O(T(M(n)) + F(n))  
T(M*f(n)) = O[T(M(n)) +       
          Hence  
T(M*f(n)) = O(T(M(n))). Then  
T(M'(n)) = T(M(n)) +                      
Now                       if F is a convex function 
and F(n) = (logn)8. Since any function O(T(M(i))) is a 
convex function (logn), we have 
T(M'(n)) = T(M(n)) + O(T(M(n))) = O(T(M(n))) 
As T(M(n)) < T(M'(n)) we get T(M(n)) = (T(M'(n))) 
In the following, we will note   this particular form of 
composition of the two Turing machines M and P that we 
described above. So M' = P  M. The composition   is 
defined for a pair (P, M) when the second argument is an 
approximation of a E-Turing machine for a given function 
f and the first one is the associated Turing machine 
computing f(i) from the intermediate results of M. Of 
course, this composition is not to be confused with the 
usual composition PoM which runs first the program M 
and then the program P with the result of the computation 
of M as input. An important difference is the computation 
time. The computation time of PoM is the sum of the 
respective computation times: 
T((PoM) (n)) = T(P(output of M(n))) + T(M(n)).  
While the computation time of P  M is:  
                         
 
             + O(1) 
                      + O(1) 
Theorem 3.2:  No approximation of a E-Turing machine 
for f can compute faster than an efficient E-Turing 
machine for f. More precisely, if M is an approximation of 
a E-Turing machine for f then T(Mf
eff
 (n)) = O(T(M(n))).   
Proof: Let M’ be the daughter of M. Since M’ is a 
E-Turing machine for f, T(Mf
eff
 (n)) = O(T(M’(n))). By 
theorem 3.1 we have T(M'(n)) = (T(M(n))). So 
T(Mf
eff
 (n)) = O(T(M(n))). 
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 See the proof in the appendix B. 
Theorem 3.3:  Let M’ be a Turing machine computing f 
based on an approximation M.  
Then:    T(M'(n))= (T(M(n))). 
Proof:  M' will compute in a time T(M'(n)) such that 
T(M(n)) ≤ T(M'(n))  ≤ T(M(n)) + F(n)  
= T(M(n)) + O(T(M*f(n))/n) 
= T(M(n)) + O(T(M(n))/n) = O(T(M(n))) 
So T(M(n)) = (T(M'(n))) 
In summary, one can say that an approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for f, its daughter and any Turing 
machine computing f based on this approximation compute 
all in the same time. 
Definition 3.6 (strongly CIR (resp CIR) function):  A 
function f(n) from N to N will be said to be strongly CIR 
(resp CIR) if and only if for any Turing machine M 
computing f there is a P-approximation of a E-Turing 
machine for f, M’ such that for every n (resp. for infinitely 
many n), the computation of f(n) by M is based on M’.   
The intuition is that if a function is strongly CIR, for each 
n there is no other way to compute f(n) than to compute 
before all the values f(i) for i<n (or values that are near in 
the sense given in the definition of an approximation of a 
E-Turing machine). There is no shortcut allowing to get 
directly the value of f(n) without having computed before 
f(n-1) or a value that is near f(n-1) and so forth for the 
previous values. If a function is CIR (but not strongly 
CIR), for infinitely many n there is no other way to 
compute f(n) than to compute before all the values f(i) for 
i<n (or values that are near).   
The reason why it’s useful to introduce this distinction 
between strongly CIR and CIR can be explained through 
the following example. Assume that f is strongly CIR. So 
there is no other way to compute f(n) than to compute 
before all the values f(i) for i<n (or values that are near) 
and that is true for every n. Let’s now consider the 
function g such that g(2i-1)=f(i) and g(2i)=1. It’s clear that 
computing g for any even value is very easy and doesn’t 
imply having to compute any other result before. So, g is 
not strongly CIR. But, the intuition is nevertheless that g is 
irreducible in some way. So, the notion of strongly CIR 
needs to be weakened to cover functions like g and many 
others that similarly need infinitely often (but not always) 
to go through the computation of all the previous values 
for computing them. 
Theorem 3.4: If a function f is strongly CIR then no 
Turing machine computing f can compute f(n) faster than 
an efficient E-Turing machine for f. So for any Turing 
machine M computing  f,  T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(M(n))). 
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Proof: If f is strongly CIR, then any Turing machine M 
computing  f is based on an approximation of a E-Turing 
machine for f. Let M’ be this approximation. From 
theorem 3.2, T(Mf
eff
(n))=O(T(M’(n))). From theorem 3.3, 
T(M(n))= (T(M’(n))).  
So T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(M(n))). 
This result is slightly weakened in the theorem 3.5 if f is 
simply CIR. In this case, for any Turing machine 
computing f, there are infinitely many values of f(n) that it 
is not possible to compute faster than the computation by 
an efficient E-Turing machine for f. 
Theorem 3.5: If a function f is CIR then for any Turing 
machine M computing f there are constants c > 0, n0 > 0 
such that N > n0, n > N, T(Mf
eff
 (n))  cT(M(n)). 
Proof: If f is CIR, then for any Turing machine M 
computing f there is a P-approximation of a E-Turing 
machine for f, M’, such that for infinitely many n, the 
computation of f(n) by M is based on M’. From 
theorem 3.2, T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(M’(n))). So, there are 
constants c > 0, n0 > 0 such that n > n0, 
T(Mf
eff
 (n))  cT(M’(n)). But N, n > N such that the 
computation of f(n) by M is based on M’. For such n 
T(M(n)) > T(M’(n)). So for those n that are superior to n0, 
T(Mf
eff
 (n))  cT(M(n)). 
Theorem 3.6: If a function f is strongly CIR then 
T(M*f(n)) = (T(Mf
eff
(n))). 
Proof: If f is strongly CIR, then by theorem 3.4 for any 
Turing machine M computing f, T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(M(n))). 
So T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(M*f(n))). By definition for any 
Turing machine M computing  f,  T(M*f(n)) = O(T(M(n))). 
So T(M*f(n)) = O(T(Mf
eff
(n))). 
Hence T(M*f(n)) = (T(Mf
eff
(n))). 
Definition 3.7 and theorems 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 address the 
two key points of the underlying intuitions for the concept 
of CIR: the speed of computation and the path followed 
during the computation. 
Let’s give two examples of functions that seem to be good 
candidates to be strongly CIR (but of course, a rigorous 
proof remains to be found).  
1. Let B={0,1} and B* be the set of all finite strings over 
B, let L be a recursive language and assume an 
enumeration of the words of B* (for example the index in 
the length-increasing lexicographic ordering). Define the 
function f by f(n) is the number of words wi (for i≤n in the 
chosen enumeration) of B* in L. Then it seems that, in 
general, there is no other way to compute f(n) than to 
decide for each i≤n if the word wi belongs or not to L and 
to count the number of positive answers. 
2. Knowing if an initial configuration of Conway’s game 
of life will be eternal or not is an undecidable problem. So 
let f(n) be the number of initial configurations of index 
smaller than n+1 in a given enumeration that are still living 
after n iterations. Here again, it seems that there is no other 
way to compute f(n) than to test each one of the relevant 
configurations during n steps and therefore, so doing, to go 
through the computation of all the f(i) for i<n. 
4. Part 3 : The Computational Analogy 
 
Let M be an approximation of a E-Turing machine for f. M 
computes a function r but is not necessarily a E-Turing 
machine for r. Nevertheles, it is clear that each E-Turing 
machine for r is an approximation of a E-Turing machine 
for f. But it is possible that no E-Turing machine for f be 
an approximation of a E-Turing machine for r. It would be 
the case if, while the time to go from n, r(n) to f(n) through 
P  is O(T(M*f (n))/n), there is no Turing machine able to 
compute r(n) from n, f(n) in a time O(T(M*r(n))/n) where 
M*r is an asymptotically optimal Turing machine for r. 
But if one E-Turing machine for f is an approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for r then every E-Turing machine for f 
will be an approximation of a E-Turing machine for r. In 
this case, each E-Turing machine for f is an approximation 
of a E-Turing machine for r and vice versa, each E-Turing 
machine for r is an approximation of a E-Turing machine 
for f. So it's possible to define a relation of "computational 
analogy" CA (which will be proved to be an equivalence 
relation): 
Definition 4.1 (Equivalence Relation: Computational 
Analogy):  f and g will be said to be computationally 
analog (noted f  CA g) if: 
(i) there exists a Turing machine M that is both a E-Turing 
machine for f and an approximation of a E-Turing 
machine for g 
(ii) there exists a Turing machine M' that is both a 
E-Turing machine for g and an approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for f 
That means that there is a Turing machine P
f->g
 which 
computes g(n) from n, f(n) for every n in a time 
F(n) = O(T(M*g(n)/n))  (and vice versa).  So: 
Theorem 4.1:  (f  CA g) is equivalent to: there is a Turing 
machine P
f->g
 which computes g(n) from n, f(n) for every n 
in a time F(n) = O(T(M*g(n)/n)) and there is a Turing 
machine P
g->f
 which computes f(n) from n, g(n) for every n 
in a time G(n) = O(T(M*f(n)/n)). 
In the following, when f CA g, we will always denote by 
P
g->f
 and P
f->g
 these Turing machines.  
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Theorem 4.2:  Let M*f (resp. M*g) be an asymptotically 
optimal Turing machine computing f (resp. g). If f CA g 
then T(M*f(n)) = (T(M*g(n))). 
Proof: The Turing machine (P
f->g
 o M
*
f) computes g in a 
time T(M*f (n)) + F(n) with F(n) = O(T(M*g(n)/n)).   
Since M*g is an asymptotically optimal Turing machines 
computing g, T(M*g(n)) = O(T(M*f(n))) + O(T(M*g(n))/n) 
so T(M*g(n)) = O(T(M*f(n))). The same reasoning with 
(P
g->f
 o M*g) proves that T(M*f(n)) = O(T(M*g(n))). Then 
T(M*f(n)) = (T(M*g(n))).  
Theorem 4.3: Let M
eff
f (resp. M
eff
g) be an asymptotically 
optimal Turing machine computing f (resp. g).  If  f CA g  
then T(Mf
eff
(n)) = (T(Mg
eff
(n))) 
Proof: The Turing machine P
f->g
  Mf
eff
 which is a 
E-Turing machine for g computes in a 
time T(P
f->g
  Mf
eff
(n)) = T(Mf
eff
(n))+       
             . 
Since Mg
eff
 is an efficient E-Turing machine 
T(Mg
eff
(n)) = O(T(P
f->g
  Mf
eff
(n))). 
Hence T(Mg
eff
(n)) = O(T(Mf
eff
(n)) +    
    
     
 
     ). 
Now        
             = O(T(M*g(n))) (see appendix 
B). 
So T(Mg
eff
(n)) = O(T(Mf
eff
(n))) + O(T(M*g(n))). Now  
T(M*g(n))= (T(M*f(n))) by theorem 4.2 and T(M*f(n)) = 
O(T(Mf
eff
(n))) then T(Mg
eff
(n))=O(T(Mf
eff
(n))). 
The same reasoning for f shows that 
T(Mf
eff
(n)) = O(T(Mg
eff
(n))).  
Hence T(Mf
eff
 (n)) = (T(Mg
eff
 (n))). 
Theorem 4.4: (f CA g) is equivalent to:  any 
approximation of a E-Turing machine for f is an 
approximation of a E-Turing machine for g and vice versa. 
Proof: Consider first the direct sense: Let M be a 
P-approximation of a E-Turing machine for f. P computes 
in a time O(T(M*f (n))/n). According to theorem 4.1, there 
is a Turing machine P
f->g
 which computes g(n) from f(n) 
for every n in a time F(n) = O(T(M*g(n))/n).  
It’s then clear that M is a (Pf->g o P)-approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for g because (P
f->g
 o P) computes in a 
time O(T(M*f (n))/n)+ O(T(M*g(n))/n) = O(T(M*g(n))/n) 
since by theorem 4.2, T(M*f(n)) = (T(M*g(n))). Consider 
now the reverse sense: a E-Turing machine for f is an 
approximation of a E-Turing machine for f so it is an 
approximation of a E-Turing machine for g (and vice 
versa). 
The very meaning of f CA g is that f and g share the same 
approximations of E-Turing machines. 
Theorem 4.5:  CA is an equivalence relation 
Proof: This is obvious by theorem 4.4. 
The quotient set of the computable functions
9
 set by this 
equivalence relation is made of equivalence classes of 
computationally analog functions (CA functions) that 
share properties about their computational complexity 
(their asymptotically optimal programs compute in the 
same time as well as their efficient E-Turing machines, by 
theorems 4.2 and 4.3) and their computational 
irreducibility as we are now going to show. 
Theorem 4.6:  Assume f CA g. If f is strongly CIR then g 
is strongly CIR. 
Proof: Let M be a Turing machine computing every g(n). 
Since f CA g, there is a Turing machine P
g->f 
which 
computes f(n) from n, g(n) for every n in a time 
F(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n). (P
g->f
oM) is a Turing machine 
computing every f(n). Now f is strongly CIR, so, there are 
a Turing machine S which is an approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for f, a Turing machine Q and a function 
H(n) = O(T(M*f(n))/n) such that for every n, the 
computation of f(n) made by (P
g->f
oM) is based on S (i.e. is 
actually the same than the computation of f(n) made by S 
followed by Q which computes in a time H(n)). Since 
f CA g, by theorem 4.4, S is also an approximation of a 
E-Turing machine for g. So during the computation of f(n) 
there are data rn,i (computed by S) appearing successively 
in an increasing order from i=1 to n on the output string of 
S such that there is a Turing machine Q’ that on input rn,i, 
computes g(i) in a number of steps H’(i) (where 
H’(n)=O(T(M*g(n))/n)). Since (P
g->f
oM) and (QoS) are the 
same Turing machine, that means that some of these rn,i 
appear during the computation of M and some appear 
during the computation of P
g->f
.  Let’s assume that all the 
rn,i  for i=1 to k, appear during the computation of M and 
that all the rn,i  for i=k+1 to n, appear during the 
computation of P
g->f
.   Let’s now consider the Turing 
machine Q’’ gotten from Q’ through the following change:  
- on input n, i, rn,i  for i=1 to k, Q’’ does the same 
computation than Q’ (i.e. computes g(i) in a time H’(i)). 
- on input n, i, rn,k  for i=k+1 to n, Q’’ starts by computing 
rn,i then computes g(i) from r(i) as Q’ does. 
Since P
g->f
 computes f(n) from n, g(n) in a time 
G(n) = O(T(M*f(n)/n)), all the rn,i  for i=k+1 to n, will 
appear in a time less than G(n). So the computation of g(i) 
from n, i, rn,k  (for i=k+1 to n), will be done in a time H”(i)  
smaller than G(n) + H’(i). Since G(n) = O(T(M*f(n)/n)),  
which is equal to O(T(M*g(n))/n) by theorem 4.2, and 
since H’(n)=O(T(M*g(n))/n)) we get H”(n) = 
O(T(M*g(n))/n).  
Let’s notice that the list of intermediate results r’n,i from 
which Q” computes g(i) is the same than the list of rn,i for 
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satisfy the requirement that there are an asymptotically optimal program 
and an Efficient E-Turing machine for them. 
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i=1 to k and is equal to rn,k  for i=k to n. That means that M 
is based on a Q”-approximation of a E-Turing machine for 
g (the Turing machine computing all the rn,i for i=1 to k) 
and so g is strongly CIR.  
Theorem 4.7:  Assume f  CA g. If f is CIR then g is CIR. 
Proof: Let M be a Turing machine computing every g(n). 
Since f CA g, there is a Turing machine P
g->f 
which 
computes f(n) from n, g(n) for every n in a time 
F(n) = O(T(Mf*(n)/n)). (P
g->f
oM) is a Turing machine 
computing every f(n). Now f is CIR so there is an 
approximation S of a E-Turing machine for f such that for 
infinitely many n the computation of f(n) by (P
g->f
oM) is 
based on S. Let’s consider the function f’ obtained from f 
by: f’(n) = f(p) where p is the nth value for which the 
computation of f by (P
g->f
oM) is based on S. It’s clear that 
f’ is strongly CIR since for every n, the computation of 
f’(n) is based on the approximation S’ which does exactly 
the same computation than S excepted that on input n, S’ 
computes the result that S computes on input p where p is 
the n
th
 value for which the computation of f by (P
g->f
oM) is 
based on S. Let g’ be the function defined similarly from 
g: g’(n) = g(p) where p is the nth value for which the 
computation of f by (P
g->f
oM) is based on S. It’s clear that 
f’ CA g’. So, g’ is strongly CIR. Then g is CIR. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have provided a formal definition of Computational 
Irreducibility that clarifies the intuition about this concept 
and that allows to understand that a function is CIR if there 
is a class of close paths that it is necessary to follow in 
order to compute it. In a broad sense, that means that if a 
function is computationally irreducible, there is only one 
road (the width of the road being the size of the class of the 
close paths that one can use) to compute this function. In a 
way, all these paths have the same length. This explains 
the fact that it is not possible to go faster than following 
one these paths to compute the function. We have also 
defined an equivalence relation between functions that 
share the same road. Roughly speaking, Computational 
Analogy allows to get a quotient set which can be viewed 
as a map of the computable functions set (or at least a large 
subset of this set whose elements satisfy the conditions for 
the above concepts to be applicable) for which classes are 
grouping elements having similar properties relatively to 
their time of computation and their computational 
irreducibility. 
An open problem is still to prove that one function among 
the possible candidates is really CIR. The cellular 
automaton rule 110 which has been shown to be universal 
(see [4]), the first candidate we mention at the beginning of 
part 2 or the two other examples we proposed at the end of 
part 2 are good examples of functions that we would like 
to prove CIR.  
On a more philosophical point of view, Computational 
Irreducibility can help clarifying the concept of emergence 
and can be used to understand why certain phenomena 
appear to be emergent. We have proposed in [19] and [20] 
that “understanding” a process implies having a mental 
model of it that we can use to simulate its behavior. 
Emergent phenomena are effects or properties appearing at 
the macro level (collective) of a system and that are caused 
by the micro level (individual) but very difficult and even 
seemingly impossible to predict even from the complete 
knowledge of the rules of the micro level. Now if the 
process running at the micro level is CIR or if the rules 
leading from the micro level to the macro level are CIR 
then the global behavior of the system will be neither 
predictable (without simulating it) nor understandable. In 
this case, what happens will be seen as “emergent”. For 
example, the fact that some patterns (pulsar, glider, glider 
gun ...) are usually considered as emergent in Conway’s 
game of life could be explained by the fact that the 
underlying rules are CIR. Similarly, phenomena that are 
sometimes interpreted as downward causation could be 
merely CIR processes interpreted as causal effects between 
the two levels of description. 
 
That’s a point that we will address with greater extension 
in a forthcoming paper. 
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Appendix A: the asymptotic notations 
The asymptotic notations are useful for comparing the 
order of magnitude of different functions. We recall here 
the standard notations. 
 
 f(n) = O(g(n)) if there are constants c > 0, n0 > 0 such 
that n > n0, |f(n)|  c|g(n)|.  
 
 f(n) = o(g(n)) if limn-> f(n)/g(n) = 0. 
 
 f(n) = (g(n)) if there are constants c > 0, n0 > 0 such 
that n > n0, |f(n)| ≥ c|g(n)|.  
 
 f (n) = ω(g(n)) if limn-> f(n)/g(n) = . 
 
 f(n) ∽ g(n) if limn-> f(n)/g(n) = 1. 
 
 f(n) = (g(n)) if there are constants c > 0, c' > 0, n0 > 0 
such that n > n0,  cg(n)   f(n)  c'g(n))  
 
 
 
Appendix B  
We prove here that                       if F is a 
convex function and F(n) = (logn).  
   
   
 
    
 
 
   
    
   
 
    
 
 
 
   
           
 
 
        pour y > 1 
Now if F is convex       
 
 
     ( y-1) F’(y)   y F’(y) so  
    
 
       
    
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
                    
Now if  log x = O(F(x)) then 
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